1
Gill P, Phythian M. Intelligence in an insecure world. Third edition. Cambridge, UK: : Polity 2018. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/reader.action?docID=5553458&ppg=175
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Richard K. Betts. Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are inevitable. World Politics 1978;31:61–89.http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/stable/2009967
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Hedley JH. Learning from Intelligence Failures. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 2005;18:435–50. doi:10.1080/08850600590945416
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James A. Examining intelligence-led policing: developments in research, policy and practice. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: : Palgrave Macmillan 2013. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/detail.action?docID=1514313
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Jervis R. Why intelligence fails: lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca, N.Y.: : Cornell University Press 2010. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/detail.action?docID=3137968
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Pillar P. Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform. Columbia University Press; Reprint edition 1AD. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/detail.action?docID=908833
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Heuer RJ. Limits of Intelligence Analysis. Orbis 2005;49:75–94. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2004.10.007
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Dover R, Goodman MS. Learning from the secret past: cases in British intelligence history. Washington, D.C.: : Georgetown University Press 2011. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/detail.action?docID=877176
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Copeland TE. Fool me twice: intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism. Leiden: : Martinus Nijhoff 2007. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/reader.action?docID=489418
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Herman M. What Difference Did It Make? Intelligence and National Security 2011;26:886–901. doi:10.1080/02684527.2011.619802
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Uri Bar-Joseph and Arie W. Kruglanski. Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise. Political Psychology 2003;24:75–99.http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/stable/3792511
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John A. Gentry. Intelligence Failure Reframed. Political Science Quarterly 2008;123:247–70.http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20203011
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Hatlebrekke KA, Smith MLR. Towards a New Theory of Intelligence Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure. Intelligence and National Security 2010;25:147–82. doi:10.1080/02684527.2010.489274
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Rovner J, Rovner J. Fixing the facts: national security and the politics of intelligence. Ithaca: : Cornell University Press 2011. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/reader.action?docID=3138236
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Lowenthal M. The Policymaker-Intelligence Relationship. In: The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence.http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28250/chapter/213370530
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Pillar P. The Perils of Politicization. In: The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence.http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28250/chapter/213372476
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Sheptycki J. Organizational Pathologies in Police Intelligence Systems: Some Contributions to the Lexicon of Intelligence-Led Policing. European Journal of Criminology 2004;1:307–32. doi:10.1177/1477370804044005
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Zegart A. 9/11 and the FBI: The organizational roots of failure. Intelligence and National Security 2007;22:165–84. doi:10.1080/02684520701415123
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Evans G. Rethinking Military Intelligence Failure – Putting the Wheels Back on the Intelligence Cycle. Defence Studies 2009;9:22–46. doi:10.1080/14702430701811987
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Betts, Richard K. Enemies of Intelligence : Knowledge and Power in American National Security. Columbia University Press 2007. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/detail.action?docID=908240
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Richard K. Betts. Fixing Intelligence. Foreign Affairs 2002;81:43–59.http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/stable/20033002
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Richard K. Betts. Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq’s Missing WMD. Political Science Quarterly 2008;122:585–606.http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20202928
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URI BAR-JOSEPH and JACK S. LEVY. Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure. Political Science Quarterly 2009;124:461–88.http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25655697
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Report of the Enquiry into the Escape from Whitemoor Prison. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272031/2741.pdf
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IRA escape a `disaster waiting to happen’ | UK | News | The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ira-escape-a-disaster-waiting-to-happen-1388101.html
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IRA jailbreakers get thousands in damages | Daily Mail Online. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-27716/IRA-jailbreakers-thousands-damages.html
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The Bichard Inquiry Report. http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/6394/1/report.pdf
28
Flanagan R. HMIC Report on Soham Murders. https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/investigation-by-cambridgeshire-constabulary-20040530.pdf
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Collier PM. Policing and the Intelligent Application of Knowledge. Public Money and Management 2006;26:109–16. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9302.2006.00509.x
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Soham murders prompted policing revolution | Crime | News | London Evening Standard. http://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/soham-murders-prompted-policing-revolution-8045802.html
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Police own up to poor intelligence, data and media strategies | UK news | The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2003/dec/18/soham.ukcrime6
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9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 2004.http://www.9-11commission.gov/
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Zegart AB, Zegart ABB. Spying blind: the CIA, the FBI, and the origins Of 9/11. Princeton: : Princeton University Press 2009. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/detail.action?docID=457948
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Goodman MA. 9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence. Intelligence and National Security 2003;18:59–71. doi:10.1080/02684520310001688871
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Pillar PR. Good literature and bad history: The 9/11 commission’s tale of strategic intelligence. Intelligence and National Security 2006;21:1022–44. doi:10.1080/02684520601046366
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Borch FL. Comparing Pearl Harbor and ‘9/11’: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility? The Journal of Military History 2003;67:845–60. doi:10.1353/jmh.2003.0201
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Marrin S. The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis. Intelligence and National Security 2011;26:182–202. doi:10.1080/02684527.2011.559140
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Pfiffner JP, Phythian M. Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq: British and American perspectives. Manchester: : Manchester University Press 2008. http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.manchesterhive.com/display/9781526130969/9781526130969.xml
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Davies P. Intelligence culture and intelligence failure in Britain and the United States. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 2004;17:495–520. doi:10.1080/0955757042000298188
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Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/about.html
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Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate. Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. 2004.http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d02406334o
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Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs — Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm
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Dennis M. Gormley. The Limits of Intelligence: Iraq’s Lessons. Published Online First: 2011. doi:10.1080/00396338.2004.9688605
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Jervis R. Reports, politics, and intelligence failures: The case of Iraq. Journal of Strategic Studies 2006;29:3–52. doi:10.1080/01402390600566282
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Phythian M. The Perfect Intelligence Failure? U.S. Pre-War Intelligence on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction. Politics Policy 2006;34:400–24. doi:10.1111/j.1747-1346.2006.00019.x
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Paul R. Pillar. Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq. Foreign Affairs 2006;85:15–27.http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/stable/20031908
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Lucas S. Recognising Politicization: The CIA and the Path to the 2003 War in Iraq. Intelligence and National Security 2011;26:203–27. doi:10.1080/02684527.2011.559141
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The Failure by Thomas Powers | The New York Review of Books. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/apr/29/the-failure/?pagination=false
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Richard L. Russell. CIA’s Strategic Intelligence in Iraq. Political Science Quarterly 2002;117:191–207.http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/stable/798180
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Russell RL. A weak pillar for American national security: The CIA’s dismal performance against WMD threats. Intelligence and National Security 2005;20:466–85. doi:10.1080/02684520500268954
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Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction - Butler Report. 2004.https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/7078/doc_7085_290_en.pdf
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Iraq Inquiry - The Report. http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/
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Danchev A. The Reckoning: Official Inquiries and the Iraq War. Intelligence and National Security 2004;19:436–66. doi:10.1080/0268452042000316232
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Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies (Flood Report). https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3308786
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Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. 2003.http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=pjcaad/wmd/report.htm
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Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks of July 7 2005. 2009.https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20090519_ISC_7-7_Review.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cqKdpgFYNagKwMI8gbLThBWwW_FZ_XpRKBFWRfOo8hX4vYnK7bIWs0Q6k1UGleR7FNPXWt3FVKGMkaaALWq4bJxLOjyAAfoqllRoEuchxfJXqLRN4RFGcpPedSpyyStqjuT_x_9TxbldxjXvKfolzHa4vyIUwwY3V1KQc_0ky3meEYh5ec70ROdFGCFftIP7xTYO9BIbJVESCk6cAqSsBfY3lQzEb834gfXv7v-eqzBBk3ZaAg%3D&attredirects=0
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Coroner’s Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120216072438/http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/docs/orders/rule43-report.pdf
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How MI5 missed the links to the July 7 suicide bombers | UK news | The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/may/01/topstories3.july7
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7/7 leader: more evidence reveals what police knew | UK news | The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/may/03/july7.topstories3
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Intelligence bungles in build-up to 7/7 attacks | UK news | The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/may/13/july7.immigrationpolicy
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7 July London bombings: 15 changes to anti-terror planning - BBC News. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33388286
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Report on Intelligence Relating to the Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby. https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20141125_ISC_Woolwich_Report%28website%29.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7coe9kaSEN2NGXBOFiV9tmDNP70ZrjZzKEIViVqua7w7wLGwdQgLhTGKHkdqzAnI_7fqg6C8neCTNNYEmAGnUY9GCHuxAa26GSV78nn-rJix8AGUZh3Az0hk3cXqSf8KxEmIS7ynD8xDRZUIY3oWeNsYtFW93ymrOtzzZLPBqaOqHWP7u-Ag3DpZWTELAABmjM9PBBv7F3z2E1cLZR9R8Ia5mP_CB3tBB_FZ9PD_zRL8bzixg3unajzeW06zQPFghwbX7AzW&attredirects=0
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Woolwich murder: Lee Rigby’s death ‘not preventable’ - BBC News. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30192912
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Lee Rigby Murder: How MI5 Monitors Terrorists Like Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/lee-rigby-murder-how-mi5-monitors-terrorists-like-michael-adebolajo-michael-adebowale-1476541
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Timeline: intelligence relating to murder of Lee Rigby | UK news | The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/25/timeline-intelligence-lee-rigby-murder
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Lee Rigby murder: Were we told the whole truth? | Crime | News | The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/lee-rigby-murder-were-we-told-the-whole-truth-9893247.html
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Stephen Castle. Failures Preceded British Soldier’s Killing. The New York Timeshttp://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy4.lib.le.ac.uk/ps/i.do?&id=GALE|A391517286&v=2.1&u=leicester&it=r&p=EAIM&sw=w
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MARRIN S. Preventing Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 2004;17:655–72. doi:10.1080/08850600490496452
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Strachan-Morris D. The Future of Civil–Military Intelligence Cooperation Based on Lessons Learned in Iraq. Intelligence and National Security 2009;24:257–74. doi:10.1080/02684520902819669
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Kettle L. Between Franks and Butler: British Intelligence Lessons from the Gulf War. Intelligence and National Security 2016;31:201–23. doi:10.1080/02684527.2014.978549
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Nomikos J, Liaropoulos A. Truly Reforming or Just Responding to Failures? Lessons Learned from the Modernisation of the Greek National Intelligence Service. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 2010;5:28–41. doi:10.1080/18335300.2010.9686939
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Dahl EJ. The Plots that Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful Terrorist Attacks Against the United States. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 2011;34:621–48. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2011.582628
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Wilkinson S. The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Olympic—Intelligence Centre: Lessons Learned from Working with the Olympic Sponsors and the Private Sector. 1AD;1:8–20.https://salusjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Wilkinson_Salus_Journal_Issue_1_Number_2_2013_pp_8-20.pdf
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Joyal RG. State fusion centers: their effectiveness in information sharing and intelligence analysis. El Paso: : LFB Scholarly Pub 2012. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/detail.action?docID=1057809
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Eric Rosenbach. The Incisive Fight: Recommendations for Improving Counterterrorism Intelligence. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 2008;618:133–47.http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/stable/40375780?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
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Intelligence and National Security.
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Marrin S, Clemente JD. Improving Intelligence Analysis by Looking to the Medical Profession. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 2005;18:707–29. doi:10.1080/08850600590945434
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Paul C, Paul C. Alert and ready: an organizational design assessment of marine corps intelligence. Santa Monica, Calif: : RAND 2011. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/leicester/Doc?id=10482340
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Shaw AN. British counterinsurgency in Brunei and Sarawak, 1962–1963: developing best practices in the shadow of Malaya. Small Wars & Insurgencies 2016;27:702–25. doi:10.1080/09592318.2016.1190052
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Sloan G. The British State and the Irish Rebellion of 1916: An Intelligence Failure or a Failure of Response? Intelligence and National Security 2012;:1–42. doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.735079
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Kahn, David. THE INTELLIGENCE FAILURE OF PEARL HARBOR. Foreign Affairs;70:138–52.http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=9112230009&site=ehost-live
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Kahana E, Stivi-Kerbis S. The Assassination of Anwar al-Sadat: An Intelligence Failure. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 2014;27:178–92. doi:10.1080/08850607.2014.842811
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Wilkinson M. Nerve agent development: a lesson in intelligence failure? Journal of Intelligence History 2015;14:96–111. doi:10.1080/16161262.2014.997005
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Smith TJ. : Intelligence Failure through Adversary Deception. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 2014;27:550–68. doi:10.1080/08850607.2014.872537
