1.
Gill P, Phythian M. Intelligence in an Insecure World. Third edition. Polity; 2018. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/reader.action?docID=5553458&ppg=175
2.
Richard K. Betts. Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are inevitable. World Politics. 1978;31(1):61-89. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/stable/2009967
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Hedley JH. Learning from Intelligence Failures. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 2005;18(3):435-450. doi:10.1080/08850600590945416
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James A. Examining Intelligence-Led Policing: Developments in Research, Policy and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan; 2013. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/detail.action?docID=1514313
5.
Jervis R. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. Vol Cornell studies in security affairs. Cornell University Press; 2010. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/detail.action?docID=3137968
6.
Pillar P. Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform. Columbia University Press; Reprint edition; 1AD. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/detail.action?docID=908833
7.
Heuer RJ. Limits of Intelligence Analysis. Orbis. 2005;49(1):75-94. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2004.10.007
8.
Dover R, Goodman MS. Learning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History. Georgetown University Press; 2011. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/detail.action?docID=877176
9.
Copeland TE. Fool Me Twice: Intelligence Failure and Mass Casualty Terrorism. Martinus Nijhoff; 2007. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/reader.action?docID=489418
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Herman M. What Difference Did It Make? Intelligence and National Security. 2011;26(6):886-901. doi:10.1080/02684527.2011.619802
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Uri Bar-Joseph and Arie W. Kruglanski. Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise. Political Psychology. 2003;24(1):75-99. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/stable/3792511
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John A. Gentry. Intelligence Failure Reframed. Political Science Quarterly. 2008;123(2):247-270. http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20203011
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Hatlebrekke KA, Smith MLR. Towards a New Theory of Intelligence Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure. Intelligence and National Security. 2010;25(2):147-182. doi:10.1080/02684527.2010.489274
14.
Rovner J, Rovner J. Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. Cornell University Press; 2011. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/reader.action?docID=3138236
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Lowenthal M. The Policymaker-Intelligence Relationship. In: The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence. http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28250/chapter/213370530
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Pillar P. The Perils of Politicization. In: The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence. http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28250/chapter/213372476
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Sheptycki J. Organizational Pathologies in Police Intelligence Systems: Some Contributions to the Lexicon of Intelligence-Led Policing. European Journal of Criminology. 2004;1(3):307-332. doi:10.1177/1477370804044005
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Zegart A. 9/11 and the FBI: The organizational roots of failure. Intelligence and National Security. 2007;22(2):165-184. doi:10.1080/02684520701415123
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Evans G. Rethinking Military Intelligence Failure – Putting the Wheels Back on the Intelligence Cycle. Defence Studies. 2009;9(1):22-46. doi:10.1080/14702430701811987
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Betts, Richard K. Enemies of Intelligence : Knowledge and Power in American National Security. Columbia University Press; 2007. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/detail.action?docID=908240
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Richard K. Betts. Fixing Intelligence. Foreign Affairs. 2002;81(1):43-59. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/stable/20033002
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Richard K. Betts. Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq’s Missing WMD. Political Science Quarterly. 2008;122(4):585-606. http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20202928
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URI BAR-JOSEPH and JACK S. LEVY. Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure. Political Science Quarterly. 2009;124(3):461-488. http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25655697
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Report of the Enquiry into the Escape from Whitemoor Prison. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272031/2741.pdf
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IRA escape a `disaster waiting to happen’ | UK | News | The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ira-escape-a-disaster-waiting-to-happen-1388101.html
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IRA jailbreakers get thousands in damages | Daily Mail Online. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-27716/IRA-jailbreakers-thousands-damages.html
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The Bichard Inquiry Report. http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/6394/1/report.pdf
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Flanagan R. HMIC Report on Soham Murders. https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/investigation-by-cambridgeshire-constabulary-20040530.pdf
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Collier PM. Policing and the Intelligent Application of Knowledge. Public Money and Management. 2006;26(2):109-116. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9302.2006.00509.x
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Soham murders prompted policing revolution | Crime | News | London Evening Standard. http://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/soham-murders-prompted-policing-revolution-8045802.html
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Police own up to poor intelligence, data and media strategies | UK news | The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2003/dec/18/soham.ukcrime6
32.
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Published 2004. http://www.9-11commission.gov/
33.
Zegart AB, Zegart ABB. Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins Of 9/11. Princeton University Press; 2009. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/detail.action?docID=457948
34.
Goodman MA. 9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence. Intelligence and National Security. 2003;18(4):59-71. doi:10.1080/02684520310001688871
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Pillar PR. Good literature and bad history: The 9/11 commission’s tale of strategic intelligence. Intelligence and National Security. 2006;21(6):1022-1044. doi:10.1080/02684520601046366
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Borch FL. Comparing Pearl Harbor and ‘9/11’: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility? The Journal of Military History. 2003;67(3):845-860. doi:10.1353/jmh.2003.0201
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Marrin S. The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis. Intelligence and National Security. 2011;26(2-3):182-202. doi:10.1080/02684527.2011.559140
38.
Pfiffner JP, Phythian M. Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives. Manchester University Press; 2008. http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.manchesterhive.com/display/9781526130969/9781526130969.xml
39.
Davies P. Intelligence culture and intelligence failure in Britain and the United States. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 2004;17(3):495-520. doi:10.1080/0955757042000298188
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Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/about.html
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Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate. Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. Published online 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d02406334o
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Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs — Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm
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Dennis M. Gormley. The Limits of Intelligence: Iraq’s Lessons. Published online 2011. doi:10.1080/00396338.2004.9688605
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Jervis R. Reports, politics, and intelligence failures: The case of Iraq. Journal of Strategic Studies. 2006;29(1):3-52. doi:10.1080/01402390600566282
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Phythian M. The Perfect Intelligence Failure? U.S. Pre-War Intelligence on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction. Politics Policy. 2006;34(2):400-424. doi:10.1111/j.1747-1346.2006.00019.x
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Paul R. Pillar. Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq. Foreign Affairs. 2006;85(2):15-27. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/stable/20031908
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Lucas S. Recognising Politicization: The CIA and the Path to the 2003 War in Iraq. Intelligence and National Security. 2011;26(2-3):203-227. doi:10.1080/02684527.2011.559141
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The Failure by Thomas Powers | The New York Review of Books. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/apr/29/the-failure/?pagination=false
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Richard L. Russell. CIA’s Strategic Intelligence in Iraq. Political Science Quarterly. 2002;117(2):191-207. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/stable/798180
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Russell RL. A weak pillar for American national security: The CIA’s dismal performance against WMD threats. Intelligence and National Security. 2005;20(3):466-485. doi:10.1080/02684520500268954
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Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction - Butler Report. Published online 2004. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/7078/doc_7085_290_en.pdf
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Iraq Inquiry - The Report. http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/
53.
Danchev A. The Reckoning: Official Inquiries and the Iraq War. Intelligence and National Security. 2004;19(3):436-466. doi:10.1080/0268452042000316232
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Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies (Flood Report). https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3308786
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Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. Published 2003. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=pjcaad/wmd/report.htm
56.
Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks of July 7 2005. Published 2009. https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20090519_ISC_7-7_Review.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cqKdpgFYNagKwMI8gbLThBWwW_FZ_XpRKBFWRfOo8hX4vYnK7bIWs0Q6k1UGleR7FNPXWt3FVKGMkaaALWq4bJxLOjyAAfoqllRoEuchxfJXqLRN4RFGcpPedSpyyStqjuT_x_9TxbldxjXvKfolzHa4vyIUwwY3V1KQc_0ky3meEYh5ec70ROdFGCFftIP7xTYO9BIbJVESCk6cAqSsBfY3lQzEb834gfXv7v-eqzBBk3ZaAg%3D&attredirects=0
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Coroner’s Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120216072438/http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/docs/orders/rule43-report.pdf
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How MI5 missed the links to the July 7 suicide bombers | UK news | The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/may/01/topstories3.july7
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7/7 leader: more evidence reveals what police knew | UK news | The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/may/03/july7.topstories3
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Intelligence bungles in build-up to 7/7 attacks | UK news | The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/may/13/july7.immigrationpolicy
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7 July London bombings: 15 changes to anti-terror planning - BBC News. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33388286
62.
Report on Intelligence Relating to the Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby. https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20141125_ISC_Woolwich_Report%28website%29.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7coe9kaSEN2NGXBOFiV9tmDNP70ZrjZzKEIViVqua7w7wLGwdQgLhTGKHkdqzAnI_7fqg6C8neCTNNYEmAGnUY9GCHuxAa26GSV78nn-rJix8AGUZh3Az0hk3cXqSf8KxEmIS7ynD8xDRZUIY3oWeNsYtFW93ymrOtzzZLPBqaOqHWP7u-Ag3DpZWTELAABmjM9PBBv7F3z2E1cLZR9R8Ia5mP_CB3tBB_FZ9PD_zRL8bzixg3unajzeW06zQPFghwbX7AzW&attredirects=0
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Woolwich murder: Lee Rigby’s death ‘not preventable’ - BBC News. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30192912
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Lee Rigby Murder: How MI5 Monitors Terrorists Like Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/lee-rigby-murder-how-mi5-monitors-terrorists-like-michael-adebolajo-michael-adebowale-1476541
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Timeline: intelligence relating to murder of Lee Rigby | UK news | The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/25/timeline-intelligence-lee-rigby-murder
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Lee Rigby murder: Were we told the whole truth? | Crime | News | The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/lee-rigby-murder-were-we-told-the-whole-truth-9893247.html
67.
Stephen Castle. Failures Preceded British Soldier’s Killing. The New York Times. http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy4.lib.le.ac.uk/ps/i.do?&id=GALE|A391517286&v=2.1&u=leicester&it=r&p=EAIM&sw=w
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MARRIN S. Preventing Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 2004;17(4):655-672. doi:10.1080/08850600490496452
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Strachan-Morris D. The Future of Civil–Military Intelligence Cooperation Based on Lessons Learned in Iraq. Intelligence and National Security. 2009;24(2):257-274. doi:10.1080/02684520902819669
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Kettle L. Between Franks and Butler: British Intelligence Lessons from the Gulf War. Intelligence and National Security. 2016;31(2):201-223. doi:10.1080/02684527.2014.978549
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Nomikos J, Liaropoulos A. Truly Reforming or Just Responding to Failures? Lessons Learned from the Modernisation of the Greek National Intelligence Service. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism. 2010;5(1):28-41. doi:10.1080/18335300.2010.9686939
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Dahl EJ. The Plots that Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful Terrorist Attacks Against the United States. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 2011;34(8):621-648. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2011.582628
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Wilkinson S. The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Olympic—Intelligence Centre: Lessons Learned from Working with the Olympic Sponsors and the Private Sector. 1AD;1(2):8-20. https://salusjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Wilkinson_Salus_Journal_Issue_1_Number_2_2013_pp_8-20.pdf
74.
Joyal RG. State Fusion Centers: Their Effectiveness in Information Sharing and Intelligence Analysis. LFB Scholarly Pub; 2012. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leicester/detail.action?docID=1057809
75.
Eric Rosenbach. The Incisive Fight: Recommendations for Improving Counterterrorism Intelligence. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 2008;618:133-147. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/stable/40375780?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
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Intelligence and National Security.
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Marrin S, Clemente JD. Improving Intelligence Analysis by Looking to the Medical Profession. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 2005;18(4):707-729. doi:10.1080/08850600590945434
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Paul C, Paul C. Alert and Ready: An Organizational Design Assessment of Marine Corps Intelligence. RAND; 2011. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/leicester/Doc?id=10482340
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Shaw AN. British counterinsurgency in Brunei and Sarawak, 1962–1963: developing best practices in the shadow of Malaya. Small Wars & Insurgencies. 2016;27(4):702-725. doi:10.1080/09592318.2016.1190052
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Sloan G. The British State and the Irish Rebellion of 1916: An Intelligence Failure or a Failure of Response? Intelligence and National Security. Published online 24 December 2012:1-42. doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.735079
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Kahn, David. THE INTELLIGENCE FAILURE OF PEARL HARBOR. Foreign Affairs. 70:138-152. http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=9112230009&site=ehost-live
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Kahana E, Stivi-Kerbis S. The Assassination of Anwar al-Sadat: An Intelligence Failure. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 2014;27(1):178-192. doi:10.1080/08850607.2014.842811
84.
Wilkinson M. Nerve agent development: a lesson in intelligence failure? Journal of Intelligence History. 2015;14(2):96-111. doi:10.1080/16161262.2014.997005
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Smith TJ. : Intelligence Failure through Adversary Deception. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 2014;27(3):550-568. doi:10.1080/08850607.2014.872537
