[1]
7 July London bombings: 15 changes to anti-terror planning - BBC News: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33388286.
[2]
7/7 leader: more evidence reveals what police knew | UK news | The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/may/03/july7.topstories3.
[3]
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: 2004. http://www.9-11commission.gov/.
[4]
Betts, Richard K. 2007. Enemies of Intelligence : Knowledge and Power in American National Security. Columbia University Press.
[5]
Borch, F.L. 2003. Comparing Pearl Harbor and ‘9/11’: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility? The Journal of Military History. 67, 3 (2003), 845–860. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1353/jmh.2003.0201.
[6]
Collier, P.M. 2006. Policing and the Intelligent Application of Knowledge. Public Money and Management. 26, 2 (Apr. 2006), 109–116. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9302.2006.00509.x.
[7]
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/about.html.
[8]
Copeland, T.E. 2007. Fool me twice: intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism. Martinus Nijhoff.
[9]
Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks of July 7 2005: 2009. https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20090519_ISC_7-7_Review.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cqKdpgFYNagKwMI8gbLThBWwW_FZ_XpRKBFWRfOo8hX4vYnK7bIWs0Q6k1UGleR7FNPXWt3FVKGMkaaALWq4bJxLOjyAAfoqllRoEuchxfJXqLRN4RFGcpPedSpyyStqjuT_x_9TxbldxjXvKfolzHa4vyIUwwY3V1KQc_0ky3meEYh5ec70ROdFGCFftIP7xTYO9BIbJVESCk6cAqSsBfY3lQzEb834gfXv7v-eqzBBk3ZaAg%3D&attredirects=0.
[10]
Dahl, E.J. 2011. The Plots that Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful Terrorist Attacks Against the United States. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 34, 8 (Aug. 2011), 621–648. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.582628.
[11]
Danchev, A. 2004. The Reckoning: Official Inquiries and the Iraq War. Intelligence and National Security. 19, 3 (Sep. 2004), 436–466. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000316232.
[12]
Davies, P. 2004. Intelligence culture and intelligence failure in Britain and the United States. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 17, 3 (Oct. 2004), 495–520. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/0955757042000298188.
[13]
Dennis M. Gormley 2011. The Limits of Intelligence: Iraq’s Lessons. (2011). DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2004.9688605.
[14]
Dover, R. and Goodman, M.S. 2011. Learning from the secret past: cases in British intelligence history. Georgetown University Press.
[15]
Eric Rosenbach 2008. The Incisive Fight: Recommendations for Improving Counterterrorism Intelligence. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 618, (2008), 133–147.
[16]
Evans, G. 2009. Rethinking Military Intelligence Failure – Putting the Wheels Back on the Intelligence Cycle. Defence Studies. 9, 1 (Mar. 2009), 22–46. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/14702430701811987.
[17]
Flanagan, R. HMIC Report on Soham Murders.
[18]
Gill, P. and Phythian, M. 2018. Intelligence in an insecure world. Polity.
[19]
Goodman, M.A. 2003. 9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence. Intelligence and National Security. 18, 4 (Dec. 2003), 59–71. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520310001688871.
[20]
Hatlebrekke, K.A. and Smith, M.L.R. 2010. Towards a New Theory of Intelligence Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure. Intelligence and National Security. 25, 2 (Apr. 2010), 147–182. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2010.489274.
[21]
Hedley, J.H. 2005. Learning from Intelligence Failures. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 18, 3 (Oct. 2005), 435–450. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600590945416.
[22]
Herman, M. 2011. What Difference Did It Make? Intelligence and National Security. 26, 6 (Dec. 2011), 886–901. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2011.619802.
[23]
Heuer, R.J. 2005. Limits of Intelligence Analysis. Orbis. 49, 1 (Dec. 2005), 75–94. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2004.10.007.
[24]
How MI5 missed the links to the July 7 suicide bombers | UK news | The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/may/01/topstories3.july7.
[25]
Intelligence bungles in build-up to 7/7 attacks | UK news | The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/may/13/july7.immigrationpolicy.
[26]
IRA escape a `disaster waiting to happen’ | UK | News | The Independent: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ira-escape-a-disaster-waiting-to-happen-1388101.html.
[27]
IRA jailbreakers get thousands in damages | Daily Mail Online: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-27716/IRA-jailbreakers-thousands-damages.html.
[28]
Iraq Inquiry - The Report: http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/.
[29]
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs — Central Intelligence Agency: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm.
[30]
James, A. 2013. Examining intelligence-led policing: developments in research, policy and practice. Palgrave Macmillan.
[31]
Jervis, R. 2006. Reports, politics, and intelligence failures: The case of Iraq. Journal of Strategic Studies. 29, 1 (2006), 3–52. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600566282.
[32]
Jervis, R. 2010. Why intelligence fails: lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. Cornell University Press.
[33]
John A. Gentry 2008. Intelligence Failure Reframed. Political Science Quarterly. 123, 2 (2008), 247–270.
[34]
Joyal, R.G. 2012. State fusion centers: their effectiveness in information sharing and intelligence analysis. LFB Scholarly Pub.
[35]
Kahana, E. and Stivi-Kerbis, S. 2014. The Assassination of Anwar al-Sadat: An Intelligence Failure. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 27, 1 (Mar. 2014), 178–192. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2014.842811.
[36]
Kahn, David THE INTELLIGENCE FAILURE OF PEARL HARBOR. Foreign Affairs. 70, 138–152.
[37]
Kettle, L. 2016. Between Franks and Butler: British Intelligence Lessons from the Gulf War. Intelligence and National Security. 31, 2 (Feb. 2016), 201–223. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.978549.
[38]
Lee Rigby Murder: How MI5 Monitors Terrorists Like Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/lee-rigby-murder-how-mi5-monitors-terrorists-like-michael-adebolajo-michael-adebowale-1476541.
[39]
Lee Rigby murder: Were we told the whole truth? | Crime | News | The Independent: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/lee-rigby-murder-were-we-told-the-whole-truth-9893247.html.
[40]
Lowenthal, M. The Policymaker-Intelligence Relationship. The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence.
[41]
Lucas, S. 2011. Recognising Politicization: The CIA and the Path to the 2003 War in Iraq. Intelligence and National Security. 26, 2–3 (Apr. 2011), 203–227. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2011.559141.
[42]
MARRIN, S. 2004. Preventing Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 17, 4 (Dec. 2004), 655–672. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600490496452.
[43]
Marrin, S. 2011. The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis. Intelligence and National Security. 26, 2–3 (Apr. 2011), 182–202. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2011.559140.
[44]
Marrin, S. and Clemente, J.D. 2005. Improving Intelligence Analysis by Looking to the Medical Profession. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 18, 4 (Dec. 2005), 707–729. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600590945434.
[45]
Nomikos, J. and Liaropoulos, A. 2010. Truly Reforming or Just Responding to Failures? Lessons Learned from the Modernisation of the Greek National Intelligence Service. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism. 5, 1 (Apr. 2010), 28–41. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/18335300.2010.9686939.
[46]
Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: 2003. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=pjcaad/wmd/report.htm.
[47]
Paul, C. and Paul, C. 2011. Alert and ready: an organizational design assessment of marine corps intelligence. RAND.
[48]
Paul R. Pillar 2006. Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq. Foreign Affairs. 85, 2 (2006), 15–27.
[49]
Pfiffner, J.P. and Phythian, M. 2008. Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq: British and American perspectives. Manchester University Press.
[50]
Phythian, M. 2006. The Perfect Intelligence Failure? U.S. Pre-War Intelligence on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction. Politics Policy. 34, 2 (Jun. 2006), 400–424. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2006.00019.x.
[51]
Pillar, P. 1AD. Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform. Columbia University Press; Reprint edition.
[52]
Pillar, P. The Perils of Politicization. The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence.
[53]
Pillar, P.R. 2006. Good literature and bad history: The 9/11 commission’s tale of strategic intelligence. Intelligence and National Security. 21, 6 (Dec. 2006), 1022–1044. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520601046366.
[54]
Police own up to poor intelligence, data and media strategies | UK news | The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2003/dec/18/soham.ukcrime6.
[55]
Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies (Flood Report): https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3308786.
[56]
Richard K. Betts 1978. Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are inevitable. World Politics. 31, 1 (1978), 61–89.
[57]
Richard K. Betts 2002. Fixing Intelligence. Foreign Affairs. 81, 1 (2002), 43–59.
[58]
Richard K. Betts 2008. Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq’s Missing WMD. Political Science Quarterly. 122, 4 (2008), 585–606.
[59]
Richard L. Russell 2002. CIA’s Strategic Intelligence in Iraq. Political Science Quarterly. 117, 2 (2002), 191–207.
[60]
Rovner, J. and Rovner, J. 2011. Fixing the facts: national security and the politics of intelligence. Cornell University Press.
[61]
Russell, R.L. 2005. A weak pillar for American national security: The CIA’s dismal performance against WMD threats. Intelligence and National Security. 20, 3 (Sep. 2005), 466–485. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520500268954.
[62]
Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate 2004. Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq.
[63]
Shaw, A.N. 2016. British counterinsurgency in Brunei and Sarawak, 1962–1963: developing best practices in the shadow of Malaya. Small Wars & Insurgencies. 27, 4 (Jul. 2016), 702–725. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1190052.
[64]
Sheptycki, J. 2004. Organizational Pathologies in Police Intelligence Systems: Some Contributions to the Lexicon of Intelligence-Led Policing. European Journal of Criminology. 1, 3 (Jul. 2004), 307–332. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370804044005.
[65]
Sloan, G. 2012. The British State and the Irish Rebellion of 1916: An Intelligence Failure or a Failure of Response? Intelligence and National Security. (Dec. 2012), 1–42. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.735079.
[66]
Smith, T.J. 2014. : Intelligence Failure through Adversary Deception. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 27, 3 (Sep. 2014), 550–568. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2014.872537.
[67]
Soham murders prompted policing revolution | Crime | News | London Evening Standard: http://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/soham-murders-prompted-policing-revolution-8045802.html.
[68]
Stephen Castle Failures Preceded British Soldier’s Killing. The New York Times.
[69]
Strachan-Morris, D. 2009. The Future of Civil–Military Intelligence Cooperation Based on Lessons Learned in Iraq. Intelligence and National Security. 24, 2 (Apr. 2009), 257–274. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520902819669.
[70]
The Failure by Thomas Powers | The New York Review of Books: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/apr/29/the-failure/?pagination=false.
[71]
Timeline: intelligence relating to murder of Lee Rigby | UK news | The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/25/timeline-intelligence-lee-rigby-murder.
[72]
Uri Bar-Joseph and Arie W. Kruglanski 2003. Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise. Political Psychology. 24, 1 (2003), 75–99.
[73]
URI BAR-JOSEPH and JACK S. LEVY 2009. Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure. Political Science Quarterly. 124, 3 (2009), 461–488.
[74]
Wilkinson, M. 2015. Nerve agent development: a lesson in intelligence failure? Journal of Intelligence History. 14, 2 (Jul. 2015), 96–111. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2014.997005.
[75]
Wilkinson, S. 1AD. The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Olympic—Intelligence Centre: Lessons Learned from Working with the Olympic Sponsors and the Private Sector. 1, 2 (1AD), 8–20.
[76]
Woolwich murder: Lee Rigby’s death ‘not preventable’ - BBC News: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30192912.
[77]
Zegart, A. 2007. 9/11 and the FBI: The organizational roots of failure. Intelligence and National Security. 22, 2 (Apr. 2007), 165–184. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520701415123.
[78]
Zegart, A.B. and Zegart, A.B.B. 2009. Spying blind: the CIA, the FBI, and the origins Of 9/11. Princeton University Press.
[79]
Coroner’s Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005. HM Coroner.
[80]
Intelligence and National Security.
[81]
Intelligence and National Security.
[82]
Report of the Enquiry into the Escape from Whitemoor Prison. Home Office - HMSO.
[83]
Report on Intelligence Relating to the Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby. Intelligence and Security Committee.
[84]
2004. Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction - Butler Report.
[85]
The Bichard Inquiry Report. The Stationery Office.
