1.
David Kahn: The Rise of Intelligence. Foreign Affairs. 85, (2006).
2.
Phythian, Mark, Stephen, Gill: Intelligence Theory : Key Questions and Debates. Intelligence Theory : Key Questions and Debates.
3.
Kahn, D.: An historical theory of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security. 16, 79–92 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306220.
4.
JOHNSON, L.: Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence*. Comparative Strategy. 22, 1–28 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930390130481.
5.
JOHNSON, L.K.: Preface to a Theory of Strategic Intelligence. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 16, 638–663 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1080/716100470.
6.
Scott, L., Jackson, P.: The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice. Intelligence and National Security. 19, 139–169 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000302930.
7.
Michael Warner: Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence’ — Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3/article02.html.
8.
Hulnick, A.S.: What’s wrong with the Intelligence Cycle. Intelligence and National Security. 21, 959–979 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520601046291.
9.
Michael Warner (eds): Central Intelligence Origin and Evolution in the US, https://www.cia.gov/static/2116cfec5d478f1e6fcc67f910759625/Origin-and-Evolution.pdf, (2001).
10.
History | MI5 - The Security Service, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/history.
11.
Gill, Peter, Peter Gill & Mark Phythian: Chapter 1: ‘What is Intelligence?’ (inc. notes). In: Intelligence in an insecure world. Polity Press, Cambridge (2006).
12.
Johnson, L.K.: National Security Intelligence in the United States: A Performance Checklist. Intelligence and National Security. 26, 607–615 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2011.604198.
13.
Moran, J.: Evaluating Special Branch and the Use of Informant Intelligence in Northern Ireland. Intelligence and National Security. 25, 1–23 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684521003588070.
14.
Cogan, C.: Hunters not Gatherers: Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century. Intelligence and National Security. 19, 304–321 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000302010.
15.
Diamond, J.M.: Re-examining Problems and Prospects in U.S. Imagery Intelligence. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 14, 1–24 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600150501308.
16.
Omand, D., Bartlett, J., Miller, C.: Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT). Intelligence and National Security. 27, 801–823 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.716965.
17.
Dupont, A.: Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century. Intelligence and National Security. 18, 15–39 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520310001688862.
18.
Sims, J.E.: Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 19, 195–217 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600500483657.
19.
Scott, L.: Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy. Intelligence and National Security. 19, 322–341 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000302029.
20.
Richard J. Aldrich: Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-). 80, 1944–753 (2004).
21.
Aid, M.M., Wiebes, C.: Introduction on The Importance of Signals Intelligence in the Cold War. Intelligence and National Security. 16, 1–26 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1080/714002838.
22.
Champion, B.: Spies (Look) Like Us: The Early Use of Business and Civilian Covers in Covert Operations. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 21, 530–564 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600701651268.
23.
Johnson, L.: Evaluating "Humint”: The Role of Foreign Agents in U.S. Security. Comparative Strategy. 29, 308–332 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2010.509635.
24.
Scott, L.: Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy. Intelligence and National Security. 19, 322–341 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000302029.
25.
A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/Tradecraft%20Primer-apr09.pdf.
26.
Heuer, R.: Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/PsychofIntelNew.pdf.
27.
Odom, W.E.: Intelligence Analysis. Intelligence and National Security. 23, 316–332 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520802121216.
28.
Johnson, L.K.: Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President’s Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate. Intelligence and National Security. 23, 333–370 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520802121257.
29.
Heuer, R.J.: Limits of Intelligence Analysis. Orbis. 49, 75–94 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2004.10.007.
30.
LEFEBVRE, S.: A Look at Intelligence Analysis. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 17, 231–264 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600490274908.
31.
Marrin, S.: Evaluating the Quality of Intelligence Analysis: By What (Mis) Measure? Intelligence and National Security. 27, 896–912 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.699290.
32.
Spielmann, K.: Strengthening Intelligence Threat Analysis. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 25, 19–43 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2012.623035.
33.
Sherman Kent: Estimates and Influence, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/4estimates.html.
34.
Jack Davis: Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis, https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol1no5.htm.
35.
Rumsfeld, D.: Press Conference, https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606g.htm.
36.
Gentry, J.A.: Warning Analysis: Focusing on Perceptions of Vulnerability. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 28, 64–88 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2014.962354.
37.
Spielmann, K.: Using Enhanced Analytic Techniques for Threat Analysis: A Case Study Illustration. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 27, 132–155 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2014.842810.
38.
Hastedt, G.: The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence: The American Experience. Intelligence and National Security. 28, 5–31 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.749062.
39.
Strachan-Morris, D.: Threat and Risk: What Is the Difference and Why Does It Matter? Intelligence and National Security. 27, 172–186 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.661641.
40.
Phythian, M.: Policing Uncertainty: Intelligence, Security and Risk. Intelligence and National Security. 27, 187–205 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.661642.
41.
Gill, P.: Intelligence, Threat, Risk and the Challenge of Oversight. Intelligence and National Security. 27, 206–222 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.661643.
42.
Canton, B.: The Active Management of Uncertainty. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 21, 487–518 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600802046939.
43.
Dunn Cavelty, M., Mauer, V.: Postmodern Intelligence: Strategic Warning in an Age of Reflexive Intelligence. Security Dialogue. 40, 123–144 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010609103071.
44.
Friedman, J.A., Zeckhauser, R.: Assessing Uncertainty in Intelligence. Intelligence and National Security. 27, 824–847 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.708275.
45.
Heazle, M.: Policy Lessons from Iraq on Managing Uncertainty in Intelligence Assessment: Why the Strategic/Tactical Distinction Matters. Intelligence and National Security. 25, 290–308 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2010.489780.
46.
Rumsfeld, D.: Press Conference, https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606g.htm.
47.
A Risk Management Standard, https://theirm.org/media/886059/ARMS_2002_IRM.pdf.
48.
Bellaby, R.: What’s the Harm? The Ethics of Intelligence Collection. Intelligence and National Security. 27, 93–117 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.621600.
49.
‘Confidential Informants in National Security Investigations’ by Daniel V. Ward, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol47/iss3/5/.
50.
Quinlan, M.: Just intelligence: Prolegomena to an ethical theory. Intelligence and National Security. 22, 1–13 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520701200715.
51.
Erskine, T.: ‘As Rays of Light to the Human Soul’? Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering. Intelligence and National Security. 19, 359–381 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000302047.
52.
David J. Garrow: FBI Political Harassment and FBI Historiography: Analyzing Informants and Measuring the Effects. The Public Historian. 10, 5–18 (1988).
53.
Herman, M.: Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001. Intelligence and National Security. 19, 342–358 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000302038.
54.
Gendron, A.: Just War, Just Intelligence: An Ethical Framework for Foreign Espionage. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 18, 398–434 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600590945399.
55.
Patterson, E., Casale, T.: Targeting Terror: The Ethical and Practical Implications of Targeted Killing. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 18, 638–652 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600590945407.
56.
Pfaff, T., Tiel, J.R.: The ethics of espionage. Journal of Military Ethics. 3, 1–15 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570310004447.
57.
Gill, P.: Security Intelligence and Human Rights: Illuminating the ‘Heart of Darkness’? Intelligence and National Security. 24, 78–102 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520902756929.
58.
A Symposium on Intelligence Ethics. Intelligence and National Security. 24, 366–386 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520903036958.
59.
Omand GCB, S.D.: Ethical Guidelines in Using Secret Intelligence for Public Security. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 19, 613–628 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570601003338.
60.
Moran, J.: Evaluating Special Branch and the Use of Informant Intelligence in Northern Ireland. Intelligence and National Security. 25, 1–23 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684521003588070.
61.
Philip Alston: Study on Targeted Killings, UN General Assembly Human Rights Council, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf, (2010).
62.
Torture prosecutions against MI5 and MI6 unlikely to be pursued, http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/jan/12/decision-torture-charges-mi5-mi6.
63.
Articles on Rendition at The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/rendition.
64.
All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, http://www.extraordinaryrendition.org/.
65.
Telegraph: MI5 and MI6 cleared of torture allegations after more than three years - but further inquiry is launched, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/9010223/MI5-and-MI6-cleared-of-torture-allegations-after-more-than-three-years-but-further-inquiry-is-launched.html.
66.
James Gaskarth: Entangling alliances? The UK’s complicity in torture in the global war on terrorism, http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01012.x, (2011).
67.
Barbara Harlow: ‘Extraordinary renditions’: tales of Guantánamo, a review article. 52, 1–29.
68.
Top judge: Binyam Mohamed case shows MI5 to be devious, dishonest and complicit in torture | World news | The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/10/binyam-mohamed-torture-mi5.
69.
Richard Norton-Taylor: Role of MI5 and MI6 in rendition has been mired by secrecy and cover-up | World news | The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/12/mi5-mi6-rendition-secrecy.
70.
Poynting, S.: Render unto Caesar. Criminal Justice Matters. 82, 14–15 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1080/09627251.2010.525919.
71.
Sanford Levinson (ed): Torture : A Collection, https://library.le.ac.uk/uhtbin/cgisirsi/x/0/0/57/5/3?searchdata1=1149401{CKEY}&searchfield1=GENERAL^SUBJECT^GENERAL^^&user_id=WEBSERVER.
72.
Alan Dershowitz: Tortured Reasoning, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/leicester/docDetail.action?docID=10263655.
73.
Torture: Ends, means and barbarity | The Economist, http://www.economist.com/node/1522792.
74.
Human Rights Watch: Britannia: British Complicity in the Torture and Ill-Treatment of Terror Suspects in Pakistan, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/11/24/cruel-britannia-0, (2009).
75.
Jane Mayer, The New Yorker, 2005: OUTSOURCING TORTURE. 81, (2005).
76.
Darius Rejali: Torture and Democracy, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/leicester/docDetail.action?docID=10320494.
77.
Julie Clarke, M.B.: Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The Circumstances in which Torture is Morally Justifiable. (2005).
78.
Julie Clarke, M.B.: Tortured Responses (A Reply to Our Critics). (2006).
79.
Philip N. S. Rumney: Chapter Eight - The Torture Debate: A Perspective from the United Kingdom, http://www.palgraveconnect.com.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9780230583542. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230583542 9780230583542 PDF 9780230551916 HB 272 pp.
80.
Roberts, A.: Review Essay: Torture and Incompetence in the ‘War on Terror’. Survival. 49, 199–212 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330701254693.
81.
Alex J. Bellamy: No Pain, No Gain? Torture and Ethics in the War on Terror. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-). 82, 1944–148 (2006).
82.
Kern, G.: Torture and Intelligence in the Global War on Terror. Intelligence and National Security. 24, 429–457 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520903037022.
83.
Steven Lukes: Liberal Democratic Torture. British Journal of Political Science. 36, 1–16 (2006).
84.
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Report on Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/study2014.html.
85.
Watching ‘Zero Dark Thirty’ with the CIA: Separating Fact from Fiction, http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/-event-transcript_111915959376.pdf.
86.
Roberts, A.: Review Essay: Torture and Incompetence in the ‘War on Terror’. Survival. 49, 199–212 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330701254693.
87.
Kahn, D.: The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor, Foreign Affairs.
88.
Herman, M.: What Difference Did It Make? Intelligence and National Security. 26, 886–901 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2011.619802.
89.
Borch, F.L.: Comparing Pearl Harbor and ‘9/11’: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility? The Journal of Military History. 67, 845–860 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1353/jmh.2003.0201.
90.
Uri Bar-Joseph and Arie W. Kruglanski: Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise. Political Psychology. 24, 75–99 (2003).
91.
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, http://www.9-11commission.gov/.
92.
Richard K. Betts: Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are inevitable. World Politics. 31, 61–89 (1978).
93.
Richard K. Betts: Fixing Intelligence. Foreign Affairs. 81, 43–59 (2002).
94.
Goodman, M.A.: 9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence. Intelligence and National Security. 18, 59–71 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520310001688871.
95.
Douglas J. MacEachin: Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community’s Record — Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/predicting-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan-the-intelligence-communitys-record/predicting-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan-the-intelligence-communitys-record.html.
96.
MARRIN, S.: Preventing Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 17, 655–672 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600490496452.
97.
Pillar, P.R.: Good literature and bad history: The 9/11 commission’s tale of strategic intelligence. Intelligence and National Security. 21, 1022–1044 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520601046366.
98.
Adamsky, D.P.: Disregarding the Bear: How US Intelligence Failed to Estimate the Soviet Intervention in the Egyptian–Israeli War of Attrition 1. Journal of Strategic Studies. 28, 803–831 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390500393977.
99.
Zegart, A.: 9/11 and the FBI: The organizational roots of failure. Intelligence and National Security. 22, 165–184 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520701415123.
100.
Hedley, J.H.: Learning from Intelligence Failures. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 18, 435–450 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600590945416.
101.
Hatlebrekke, K.A., Smith, M.L.R.: Towards a New Theory of Intelligence Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure. Intelligence and National Security. 25, 147–182 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2010.489274.
102.
Evans, G.: Rethinking Military Intelligence Failure – Putting the Wheels Back on the Intelligence Cycle. Defence Studies. 9, 22–46 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1080/14702430701811987.
103.
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs — Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm.
104.
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/about.html.
105.
Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=pjcaad/wmd/report.htm.
106.
Danchev, A.: The Reckoning: Official Inquiries and the Iraq War. Intelligence and National Security. 19, 436–466 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000316232.
107.
Davies, P.: Intelligence culture and intelligence failure in Britain and the United States. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 17, 495–520 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1080/0955757042000298188.
108.
Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies (Flood Report), https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3308786.
109.
Dennis M. Gormley: The Limits of Intelligence: Iraq’s Lessons. (2011). https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2004.9688605.
110.
Jervis, R.: Reports, politics, and intelligence failures: The case of Iraq. Journal of Strategic Studies. 29, 3–52 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600566282.
111.
Phythian, M.: The Perfect Intelligence Failure? U.S. Pre-War Intelligence on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction. Politics Policy. 34, 400–424 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2006.00019.x.
112.
Paul R. Pillar: Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq. Foreign Affairs. 85, 15–27 (2006).
113.
Marrin, S.: The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis. Intelligence and National Security. 26, 182–202 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2011.559140.
114.
Lucas, S.: Recognising Politicization: The CIA and the Path to the 2003 War in Iraq. Intelligence and National Security. 26, 203–227 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2011.559141.
115.
The Failure by Thomas Powers | The New York Review of Books, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/apr/29/the-failure/?pagination=false.
116.
Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction - Butler Report, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/7078/doc_7085_290_en.pdf, (2004).
117.
Richard L. Russell: CIA’s Strategic Intelligence in Iraq. Political Science Quarterly. 117, 191–207 (2002).
118.
Russell, R.L.: A weak pillar for American national security: The CIA’s dismal performance against WMD threats. Intelligence and National Security. 20, 466–485 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520500268954.
119.
Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate: Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d02406334o, (2004).
120.
Farson, S.: Parliament and its servants: Their role in scrutinizing Canadian intelligence. Intelligence and National Security. 15, 225–258 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432609.
121.
Canadian Security Intelligence Review Committee, http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/index-eng.html.
122.
Shore, J.J.M.: Intelligence Review and Oversight in Post-9/11 Canada. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 19, 456–479 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600600656350.
123.
Schwarz, F.A.O.: The Church Committee and a new era of intelligence oversight. Intelligence and National Security. 22, 270–297 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520701303881.
124.
Johnson, L.K.: The Church Committee Investigation of 1975 and the Evolution of Modern Intelligence Accountability. Intelligence and National Security. 23, 198–225 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520801977337.
125.
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/.
126.
Müller-Wille, B.: Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence. Intelligence and National Security. 21, 100–128 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520600568394.
127.
Boraz, S.C.: Establishing Democratic Control of Intelligence in Colombia. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 19, 84–109 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600500177168.
128.
Díaz Fernández, A.M.: Halfway down the road to supervision of the Spanish intelligence services. Intelligence and National Security. 21, 440–456 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520600750687.
129.
Peter Gill: The Intelligence and Security Committee and the Challenge of Security Networks. Review of International Studies. 35, (2009).
130.
Gill, P.: Evaluating intelligence oversight committees: The UK Intelligence and Security Committee and the ‘war on terror’. Intelligence and National Security. 22, 14–37 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520701200756.
131.
Phythian, M.: The British experience with intelligence accountability. Intelligence and National Security. 22, 75–99 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520701200822.
132.
Glees, A., Davies, P.H.J.: Intelligence, Iraq and the limits of legislative accountability during political crisis. Intelligence and National Security. 21, 848–883 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520600957787.
133.
Ian Leigh, H.B.: Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services. In: SIPRI Yearbook 2007.
134.
Puyvelde, D.V.: Intelligence Accountability and the Role of Public Interest Groups in the United States. Intelligence and National Security. 28, 139–158 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.735078.
135.
Leigh, I.: Rebalancing Rights and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 9/11. Intelligence and National Security. 27, 722–738 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.708525.
136.
Hillebrand, C.: The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight. Intelligence and National Security. 27, 689–706 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.708521.
137.
National security and intelligence - Inside Government - GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-security.
138.
Byman, D.: The Intelligence War on Terrorism. Intelligence and National Security. 29, 837–863 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.851876.
139.
Moran, J., Phythian, M.: Intelligence, security and policing post-9/11: The UK’s response to the war on terror. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke (2008).
140.
Sims, J.: Intelligence to counter terror: The importance of all-source fusion. Intelligence and National Security. 22, 38–56 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520701200772.
141.
Making Sense of Snowden. The Political Quarterly. 84, 433–435 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2013.12053.x.
142.
Johnson, L.K., Aldrich, R.J., Moran, C., Barrett, D.M., Hastedt, G., Jervis, R., Krieger, W., McDermott, R., Omand, D., Phythian, M., Wark, W.K.: An Special Forum: Implications of the Snowden Leaks. Intelligence and National Security. 29, 793–810 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.946242.
143.
Bauman, Z., Bigo, D., Esteves, P., Guild, E., Jabri, V., Lyon, D., Walker, R.B.J.: After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance. International Political Sociology. 8, 121–144 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1111/ips.12048.
144.
UK Intelligence and Security Committee - Transcript of Evidence Provided by Heads of UK Intelligence Agencies, https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/20131107_ISC_uncorrected_transcript.pdf.
145.
Richards, J.: Intelligence Dilemma? Contemporary Counter-terrorism in a Liberal Democracy. Intelligence and National Security. 27, 761–780 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.708528.
146.
Gill, P.: Evaluating intelligence oversight committees: The UK Intelligence and Security Committee and the ‘war on terror’. Intelligence and National Security. 22, 14–37 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520701200756.
147.
Gill, P.: Security Intelligence and Human Rights: Illuminating the ‘Heart of Darkness’? Intelligence and National Security. 24, 78–102 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520902756929.
148.
How MI5 missed the links to the July 7 suicide bombers | UK news | The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/may/01/topstories3.july7.
149.
7/7 leader: more evidence reveals what police knew | UK news | The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/may/03/july7.topstories3.
150.
Internet jihad: A world wide web of terror | The Economist, http://www.economist.com/node/9472498.
151.
Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks of July 7 2005, https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20090519_ISC_7-7_Review.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cqKdpgFYNagKwMI8gbLThBWwW_FZ_XpRKBFWRfOo8hX4vYnK7bIWs0Q6k1UGleR7FNPXWt3FVKGMkaaALWq4bJxLOjyAAfoqllRoEuchxfJXqLRN4RFGcpPedSpyyStqjuT_x_9TxbldxjXvKfolzHa4vyIUwwY3V1KQc_0ky3meEYh5ec70ROdFGCFftIP7xTYO9BIbJVESCk6cAqSsBfY3lQzEb834gfXv7v-eqzBBk3ZaAg%3D&attredirects=0.
152.
US House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee Report - The Road to Boston: Counterterrorism Challenges and Lessons from the Marathon Bombings, https://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/documents/Boston-Bombings-Report.pdf.
153.
OIG Report - Unclassified Summary of Information Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings, http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2014/s1404.pdf.
154.
Russia Didn’t Share All Details on Boston Bombing Suspect, Report Says - NYTimes.com, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/us/russia-failed-to-share-details-on-boston-marathon-bombing-suspect.html?_r=0.
155.
Russia: Boston bombing report is effort to ‘whitewash US intelligence failures’ - RT News, http://rt.com/news/russia-boston-bombing-report-180/.
